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Abstract— This work presents a novel ensemble of Bayesian
Neural Networks (BNNs) for control of safety-critical systems.
Decision making for safety-critical systems is challenging due
to performance requirements with significant consequences in
the event of failure. In practice, failure of such systems can
be avoided by introducing redundancies of control. Neural
Networks (NNs) are generally not used for safety-critical
systems as they can behave in unexpected ways in response
to novel inputs. In addition, there may not be any indication
as to when they will fail. BNNs have been recognized for their
ability to produce not only viable outputs but also provide a
measure of uncertainty in these outputs. This work combines
the knowledge of prediction uncertainty obtained from BNNs
and ensemble control for a redundant control methodology.
Our technique is applied to an agile autonomous driving task.
Multiple BNNs are trained to control a vehicle in an end-to-end
fashion on different sensor inputs provided by the system. We
show that an individual network is successful in maneuvering
around the track but crashes in the presence of unforeseen
input noise. Our proposed ensemble of BNNs shows successful
task performance even in the event of multiple sensor failures.
I. INTRODUCTION
Neural Networks (NNs) are currently one of the most
powerful tools for solving difficult problems in decision
making such as playing Go [1] or medical diagnosis [2],
[3]. Notably, NNs are able to perform rapid and complex
computations through relatively simple nonlinear calcula-
tions and massive parallel structures. Because of this, NNs
have been applied to a variety of difficult classification and
regression problems from object detection to robotics. One
such task that benefits from the performance of NNs is
end-to-end imitation learning for autonomous driving. In
this task, difficulty arises in mapping sensor inputs into
driving commands [4]. Previous work, such as [4], [5], [6],
shows the successful use of end-to-end imitation learning
with applications to autonomous driving and manipulation
with visual inputs. Under the imitation learning settings, a
system can efficiently learn a task, guided by an expert.
However, much of the previous work does not investigate the
robustness of the learned end-to-end model to compromised
sensors.
Although NNs are capable of successfully completing
difficult tasks in a variety of applications, they are not
without drawbacks. One drawback is that it can be nearly
impossible to determine what the output of the NN will be
given an input without using the NN itself. This is due to
the nonlinear computational structure and a large number of
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parameters. Another drawback is that NNs are also heavily
reliant on data; they generally can not make use of prior
knowledge such as dynamics models. When confronted with
a new input, the output of the network can vary drastically,
even if there are similarities to inputs from training data.
Even small perturbations to the input can alter the output
of Deep NNs [7], [8] and the Deep NNs are easily fooled
[9]. This means we do not have a consistent mapping from
inputs to outputs. In the context of safety, traditional NNs
do not provide a measure of uncertainty of the output.
In recent years, however, new improvements have been
made on probabilistic NNs. Bayesian Neural Networks
(BNNs) are a probabilistic network structure that produces a
distribution of outputs rather than a single output. This out-
put distribution provides valuable information showing how
certain or uncertain the output is. With the ability to mea-
sure uncertainty, NNs become a viable option for ensemble
techniques used for decision making. Ensemble techniques
consist of a set of hypotheses from which they choose one
as the output. In [10], the ensembles of perturbed models are
used to perform robust trajectory optimization with respect
to model uncertainty. The work in [11] demonstrated that
a simple ensemble model can effectively approximate the
predictive uncertainty of Deep Learning (DL) if the objective
function obeys a proper scoring rule. This method used
multiple NNs with different initializations to serve as indi-
vidual models of an ensemble for approximating predictive
uncertainty. However, the obtained predictive uncertainty was
not directly used for improving the performance of the target
task.
With knowledge of the uncertainty of each hypothesis,
ensemble techniques can be used in safety-critical systems
where the failure of the system causes tragic results. In this
work, we propose a novel ensemble of end-to-end BNNs to
provide an elegant solution to sensor failure in safety-critical
systems. Our method is applied to the platform seen in Fig. 1,
with the task of agile autonomous driving. With aggressive
maneuvers on harsh terrain, sensors can fail from damage
or are unable to operate effectively with rapidly changing
conditions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in Section II,
we provide background information for the key ideas used in
this paper. In Section III we introduce our ensemble BNNs
structures and provide the algorithm for decision making. We
discuss the expert used for data collection in Section IV and
present results in Section V. Finally, we give our conclusions
and discuss future work in Section VI.
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II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we will cover a few concepts central to
our proposed research solution. In order to detect sensor
failure, we will be measuring uncertainty in NN models, in
comparison to the more traditional approach of sensor fault
detection before passing sensor information to a NN. There
exists an extensive literature on sensor failure detection [12],
[13], [14] that demonstrates its application in various fields.
However, this approach requires knowledge of the expected
sensor outputs to determine whether a reading is normal or
faulty. Our approach lets the learned model itself address
this problem by utilizing the probabilistic counterpart of
the traditional NNs, namely BNNs. This Bayesian approach
of deep learning removes the need for any beforehand
knowledge of expected sensor outputs. A brief overview of
types of uncertainty is given to provide the motivation of
BNNs. We finish by briefly covering Imitation Learning,
which is the method we use to train our models.
A. Aleatoric and Epistemic Uncertainty
Model uncertainty can be classified into two major cat-
egories [15]: aleatoric and epistemic uncertainty. Aleatoric
uncertainty is a result of the model’s inability to fully
describe the environment, while epistemic uncertainty is a
result of the inability to acquire unlimited data. In the first
case, uncertainty arises when different outcomes are obtained
even with the same experimental setup. The source of this
type of uncertainty is the hidden variables that can not be
perfectly characterized or measured. Epistemic uncertainty
arises when the model is presented data not seen previously.
The source for this type of uncertainty is a data set that does
not fully cover the sample space. In application, it is not
possible to completely eliminate either form of uncertainty
as we do not have access to a perfect model or unlimited
data.
The origin of aleatoric uncertainty suggests that we should
be able to train a model to output this type of uncertainty
given data. Meanwhile, we should also be able to measure
the epistemic uncertainty of a model through some form of
sampling. In this paper, the total predictive uncertainty is
calculated to be the combination of both uncertainty types.
B. Bayesian Neural Networks
Currently, there exist two popular methods to obtain a
predictive probability distribution in the deep learning lit-
erature. The first technique uses Bayesian Backpropagation
[16], which assigns a probability prior, usually Gaussian, to
Fig. 1. Left: The 1/5 scaled ground vehicle for autonomous driving and
racing. Right: The oval track used for experiments.
the weights in the network. The network is trained by min-
imizing the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence between the
distribution on the weights and the true Bayesian posterior
distribution.
The second approach uses dropout layers to produce a
predictive distribution resulting from a probabilistic network
structure [17]. The Monte Carlo dropout approach is adopted
in this paper since the alternative approach requires at least
doubling the number of parameters in the network, which
makes it difficult to run a large scale convolutional Neural
Networks with only the computational resources on-board
the vehicle. Using the existing NN structure with dropout
added to every weight layer, weights in the network are ran-
domly dropped with a certain probability. At every forward
pass, we sample a dropout mask from a Bernoulli distribution
to determine weights dropped in each layer. During the
backward pass, only the remaining weights are updated. The
outputs of the network then become a Gaussian Distribution,
returning the mean and variance of the prediction values.
When trained with the loss function described in Section III-
B and Section III-C, these outputs becomes a combination of
aleatoric and epistemic uncertainty. The work in [17] shows
the mathematical equivalence between an approximated deep
Gaussian process and a NN with arbitrary depth and non-
linearities when dropout layers are applied before and after
every weight layer. The output distribution is estimated with
Monte Carlo sampling, which can be done in parallel to
reduce run-time.
C. Imitation Learning
Imitation Learning (IL), also called “learning from demon-
stration”, is a type of supervised machine learning. IL is
often used when the optimal solution to the task is not
easily accessible or too computationally expensive to run
in real time. IL algorithms assume that an oracle policy or
expert is available. The expert can utilize resources that are
unavailable for the imitation learner at test time, such as
additional sensory information and computing power. In the
case of autonomous driving, the expert can be a sophisticated
optimal control algorithm or an experienced human driver.
The observation-action or state-action pairs generated by the
expert is then used to train the imitation learner. The goal of
IL is to mimic the expert’s behavior as well as possible. In
[4] IL’s ability to perform the autonomous driving task with
low-cost sensors is demonstrated on real-world experiments.
In the traditional formulation, the goal is often to find
a policy pi : O → U that minimizes an expected loss or
maximizes an expected reward over a discrete finite time
horizon H:
min
pi
Eppi
[
H−1∑
t=0
l(xt, ut)
]
, (1)
where xt ∈ S, ut ∈ U , and S,O,U are the state, observation
and admissible control spaces respectively. l is the immediate
loss function. ppi is the joint distribution of xt, ut, and ot ∈ O
for the policy pi for t = 0, ...,H − 1.
For imitation learning, this equation changes slightly. The
goal now becomes to learn a policy that minimizes a loss
function that characterizes the difference between the learned
model and the expert policy pi∗ rather than the most optimal
pi:
piNN = arg min
pi
Eppi∗ [l(xt, ut)] , (2)
where ut = pi(ot) and piNN denotes the neural network
policy chosen. In our work, we trained our networks with
batch imitation learning.
III. ENSEMBLE BAYESIAN DECISION MAKING
A. Problem Formulation
The main problem considered in this paper is the au-
tonomous driving task for a 1/5 scaled ground vehicle
(Fig. 1) using deep neural network-based end-to-end control
policies under the sensor failure cases. As mentioned in
Section I, many applications of deep end-to-end control
do not provide a principle solution to sensor failure. Most
self-driving cars today depend on different kinds of sen-
sors including Lidar, Radar, GPS, and cameras. However,
in the real world, these sensors are vulnerable to noise.
In one example, differential GPS (dGPS) is widely used
for autonomous driving to obtain global positions in the
world frame. Despite many advances in GPS technology,
there is always the probability that the GPS signal jumps
or slightly diverges from the true position. In areas with
obstacles such as tall buildings or indoor parking lots, GPS
tends to fail altogether. Additionally, cameras are sensitive
to light conditions and interference from external sources.
In autonomous driving, even a slight shift of the GPS data
or an obscured camera may cause the car to pass the center
line of the road with significant consequences. To avoid these
failures, system redundancy is crucial for the safe operation
of autonomous driving.
System redundancy is commonly applied in many safety-
critical applications, where multiple backup systems exist to
prevent catastrophic failure from one faulty component, as
shown in [18]. Redundancy is usually achieved by either
duplicating the same system or using different systems that
perform the same task. It is easy to have duplicative systems
available in case of failure, but they are vulnerable to faults of
the underlying system. Dissimilar backups, where different
hardware, software, and control laws are used in each backup
system, can alleviate this problem, but it is hard to determine
how the backup systems are prioritized when a failure occurs.
In this work, an ensemble Bayesian decision making pro-
cess is used to provide system redundancy. Multiple BNNs
are implemented on the vehicle, each taking in a different
sensory input and having the capability of performing the
task on its own. Each BNN is trained end-to-end, learning
the low-level control actions from each sensor input. When
one or more of the sensors is compromised, the associated
predictive uncertainty to the failed sensor should see a
significant increase that causes the system to switch to the
remaining functional networks.
B. Ensemble Structure
Our ensemble consists of 3 BNNs. Each BNN differs in
their network input as well as their network structure. They
output the mean, uˆ, and the variance, σˆ2, of the model caused
by the aleatoric uncertainty. The first BNN is trained on the
fully-observable state data gathered from GPS module. Its
network structure is fully connected with ReLU activation
functions and layers of width 1024, 512, 256, and 128,
respectively. The second network is trained on images taken
from the camera on the left side of the vehicle shown in
Fig. 3. It is using the VGG 16 [19]-like network, with
modifications to include dropout at each layer as well as
output the variance, σˆ2 stemming from aleatoric uncertainty
[20]. This deep neural network is composed of ∼30 million
trainable parameters, depending on the size of the input. The
last network is trained on images taken from the camera on
the right side of the vehicle shown in Fig. 3 and has the
same network structure as the second network. The overall
network structure can be seen in Fig. 2.
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Fig. 2. Ensemble Network Structure composed of end-to-end Bayesian
Networks.
To ensure that the outputs of each BNN are the mean and
variance due to aleatoric uncertainty, the heteroscedastic loss
function is used. This loss function used is defined in [15],
and is as follows:
L(pi) = 1
2σˆ2
||u∗ − uˆ||2 + 1
2
log(σˆ2), (3)
where pi is the current policy of the network, u∗ is the
expert’s action for input x, uˆ is the aleatoric mean for input
x, σˆ2 is the aleatoric variance for input x. To see how σˆ2
is a measure of the aleatoric variance, let us think about
how aleatoric variance should behave. We would like that
the predictions (uˆ) that are close to the expert’s output (u∗) –
resulting in a low residual error – have low aleatoric variance.
Predictions that are far away from the expert’s output –
resulting in a high residual error – should also have high
aleatoric variance. To minimize Eq. (3) when the residual
error is high, σˆ2 must increase so that the residual error
does not have a strong impact on the loss. When the residual
error is small, it is observed that σˆ2 also needs to be small in
order to minimize Eq. (3). Intuitively, since σˆ2 follows the
increase or decrease of the residual error to obtain a minimal
loss, [15] concludes that σˆ2 is at least an approximation of
the aleatoric variance. In practice, the heteroscedastic loss
function is modified slightly to:
L(pi) = 1
2
exp(−s)||u∗ − uˆ||2 + 1
2
s, (4)
where s = log(σˆ2). By regressing with s, we avoid a
potential ’division by 0’ error and can still easily calculate
σˆ2. These means and variances are then used to find the
output of the ensemble network as described in the next
section.
C. Implementation
To get a better calibrated uncertainty measure, we used
Concrete Dropout [21], which allows for automatic tuning
of the dropout probability in large models. The output of the
redundant system structure is calculated in Algorithm 1. As
described in Section II-B, we need to sample our networks
multiple times in order to generate the output predictive
distribution. In Algorithm 1, instead of conducting multiple
runs of the network i on a single input xi, we duplicate
each input nMC times to create an input sequence Xi, and
then input this sequence through the network, where nMC is
the number of samples used for Monte Carlo sampling. The
two outputs of network i are a vector of control commands
uˆi and a vector of the aleatoric variances σˆ2i . Using these
vector outputs the overall variance (aleatoric and epistemic
combined) of each BNN is calculated with the following
equation (step 4 in Algorithm 1):
σ2i = V ar(ui) ≈
1
K
K∑
k=1
uˆ2ik −
(
1
K
K∑
k=1
uˆik
)2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
epistemic
+
1
K
K∑
k=1
σˆ2ik︸ ︷︷ ︸
aleatoric
,
(5)
where ui is the output of network i, uˆi is the aleatoric mean
of network i, σˆ2i is the aleatoric variance of network i, and
(uˆi, σˆ2i ) is the set of K sampled outputs from network i.
Algorithm 1 Ensemble Bayesian Neural Networks
Input:
xL: Image from left camera;
xR: Image from right camera;
xGPS : States from GPS
1: while Task not failed do
2: XL,XR,XGPS ← Duplicate xL,xR,xGPS
3: uˆL, σˆ
2
L ← DropoutVGG16(XL)
uˆR, σˆ
2
R ← DropoutVGG16(XR)
uˆGPS , σˆ
2
GPS ← FC4(XGPS)
4: uL, uR, uGPS ← Mean(uˆL, uˆR, uˆGPS)
σ2L, σ
2
R, σ
2
GPS ← Var(uˆL, uˆR, uˆGPS , σˆ2L, σˆ2R, σˆ2GPS)
5: u¯← MinVar(uL, uR, uGPS , σ2L, σ2R, σ2GPS)
6: end while
Output: u¯: Steering command for the vehicle
The control of each network i is calculated as the mean of
that network’s sampled outputs:
ui =
1
K
K∑
k=1
uˆik . (6)
Note that, in step 3 in Algorithm 1, the computation
(prediction) of all Bayesian Networks happens in parallel.
Finally the output u¯ is chosen from the network i with the
lowest variance, σ2i , as shown in step 5.
There are two possible ways to do the ensemble Bayesian
decision making. One approach is weighting individual net-
work policies with some weights that inversely proportional
to their variance. However, this weighting approach is not an
optimal solution when the system encounters a multi-modal
situation. For example, if one of the network policies tries to
drive a vehicle to the left and the other tries to steer it to the
right and they have almost equal weights, the ensemble of the
policies will guide the vehicle to go straight. This can lead
to a tragic result if the network policies made a prediction
to drive either left or right and there is an obstacle on the
straight.
The other way to do ensemble Bayesian decision making
is to pick the best decision according to its confidence, as
we proposed in step 5 in Algorithm 1. This approach helps
avoid choosing non-optimal control policies in multi-modal
decision cases.
IV. DATA COLLECTION
In order to train each learner (BNN) in the ensemble, the
iterative Linear Quadratic Gaussian/Model Predictive Con-
trol Differential Dynamic Programming (iLQG/MPC-DDP)
[22] algorithm was used as an expert. Differential Dynamic
Programming (DDP) is an algorithm that uses second-order
approximations of the cost function and system dynamics
around a nominal trajectory to solve the Bellman equation.
The optimal control policy is then used to update the nominal
trajectory. Running DDP in Model Predictive Control (MPC)
fashion means that at every timestep, only the first control
action is executed by the system, and the control policy is
re-optimized at the next timestep when new state information
is received. For our long-term autonomous driving task, we
used the receding horizon DDP [22].
Using GPS data, the expert had the following state space
[px, py , θ, ψ, Vx, Vy , θ˙] as input, where px and py are global
positions in the world frame, θ and ψ are the heading and roll
angle of the car, Vx and Vy are the body frame longitudinal
and lateral velocities, and θ˙ is the derivative of the heading
angle.
We considered the cost function for the optimal con-
troller composed of an arbitrary state-dependent cost and
a quadratic control cost. The state-dependent term was
designed to stay in the center of the track (px,des, py,des)
while maintaining the desired forward velocity Vx,des. We
set Vx,des as 5m/s when we collect data. For the control cost,
we used the same weights for both throttle and steering.
The expert drove around an oval track seen in Fig. 1 for
100 laps in one direction to gather data for each learner.
As it drove around, the GPS data and truncated 64x128x3
RGB images from the left and right cameras were saved
in order to train each of the learner models described in
Section III. For training of the Dropout VGG 16 Net [20], we
did not use any data augmentation technique (random flips,
rotations, contrast, brightness, saturation, jitter, etc.) but we
truncated and cropped the original 4k image to reduce the
size of it to 64x128x3. All of our models were trained in
batch with Tensorflow [23] using the Adam optimizer [24]
and the heteroscedastic loss in Eq. (4).
V. EXPERIMENTS/RESULTS
All computation was executed on-board the vehicle with
our NVIDIA GeForce GTX 1050 GPU and we were able to
obtain 10 Monte Carlo samples (nMC = 10) of the ensemble
in real time (20Hz). We injected artificial noise signal to
each sensor similar to a real-world situation in which a
sensor malfunctions. The position noise was sampled from
a uniform distribution to make the ”new position” appear
to be outside of the track. This is commonly seen as GPS
data jumps from one location to another. For images, rows of
gray bars were added to simulate periodic noise caused by
electro-mechanical interference during the image capturing
process (Fig. 4b).
Fig. 3. Platform sensors connected to the on-board computer. Left: Two
vision cameras, 1280x1024, 70fps, global shutter, synchronously triggered.
Right: RTK-corrected Hemisphere Eclipse P307 GPS module, position at
20Hz.
(a) Raw image (b) Image with artificial noise
Fig. 4. Artificial noise injected to an input image at test time.
First, we tested each BNN in the ensemble network
without any artificial noise injected. Each BNN was able to
drive the vehicle autonomously until the vehicle’s batteries
run out and there were no failures. In all experiments, we
considered the failure cases as when the vehicle crashes to
the boundaries of the track and cannot move forward.
Next, each learner in the ensemble was tested individually
on the vehicle with artificial noise injected. After 4 laps of
normal operation, noise was added to the corresponding sen-
sor and crashes occurred immediately, as shown in Fig. 5b,
Fig. 5c and Fig. 5d. The test was repeated 10 times for each
learner and crashes followed promptly after noise injection
every time.
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Fig. 5. Trajectory plots of imitation learning of autonomous driving with
injected noise. The red trajectories are after the noise injected to each
model’s input after 4 laps of autonomous driving. We ran 10 experiments
for each and all end-to-end learners immediately failed the task.
Following this experiment, the Ensemble Bayesian Neural
Networks algorithm was tested without noise injection. The
vehicle achieved similar performance to the expert, as seen in
Fig. 5a, and was able to run at a high speed with no crashes.
Finally, the Ensemble BNN algorithm was tested with
noise injection. The time horizon for testing was set to be
17 laps. The algorithm was tested on the track 3 times for a
total of 51 laps. After 4 laps of normal operation (Fig. 6a),
frequent noise was added to each sensor in the order of GPS,
left camera, and right camera for 2 laps. Normal operation
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(a) 1-4th, 7-8th, 11-12th, and 15-17th laps of trajectory plots of Ensemble
Bayesian decision making without any artificial noise injected.
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(b) 5-6th laps with frequent noise injected in position x and y data in the
GPS signal.
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(c) 9-10th laps with frequent noise injected in the left camera.
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(d) 13-14th laps with frequent noise injected in both cameras.
Fig. 6. Each lap is plotted with the colors of the learner whose action has been chosen: GPS NN, Left camera NN and Right camera NN. The algorithm
was tested on the track 3 times for a total of 51 laps without failure of the task.
resumed for another 2 laps before the next noise injection.
As we can see from the normal operation case in Fig. 6a,
GPS NN was usually used for most of the time. This is
because the structure of the GPS NN and the data (7 states)
used for it were not complex as the structure of the Dropout
VGG 16 network [20] and the data (RGB image) used for it.
With a simpler structure and data, it is reasonable to have a
smaller variance from the probabilistic network after training.
Moreover, without any injection of artificial noise, GPS data
at test time does not change much compared to the training
data whereas the image from the camera slightly changes due
to the change of the lighting conditions and the environment
around the vehicle. Fig. 6b shows that when artificial GPS
noise was added, the algorithm opted to use camera inputs
for navigation as a result of orders of magnitude increase in
prediction uncertainty from the fully connected GPS NN. For
both normal case and GPS-noise injected case, we observe
that the left camera NN was used more often than the
right camera NN. We believe this behavior is task-specific,
as the vehicle run the oval track in counterclockwise for
both data-collecting and testing. Since the left camera is
able to see the left track boundary more often than the
right camera does, the left camera NN is more confident
about its prediction, resulting in smaller variance. Fig. 6c
demonstrated a decrease in usage of the left camera input,
since image noise caused uncertainty from the corresponding
network to double. Similar results can be found in Fig. 6d
when image noise was added to both left and right cameras.
Compared to the cases where we did not inject any noise
(Fig. 6a) or noise was injected in a single camera (Fig. 6c),
we can see the decreased usage of both cameras. For all
cases of noise injection scenarios, the noise was injected
frequently, but not always, so the noise-injected learner could
be used intermittently when the noise did not exist. The usage
of each learner with sensor noise injection is listed in Table I.
In all cases, the usage of the sensor(s) was decreased when
the artificial noise was injected to the sensor(s). Even with
large noise, which causes the immediate failure of the task
for an individual BNN, all laps were completed without any
failure. The complete trial can be seen in the video1.
TABLE I
LEARNER USAGE ON EACH LAP
Laps 1-4, 7-8, 11-12 5-6 9-10 13-14
Noise injected in - GPS Left Cam Both Cams
GPS NN(%) 73.4 22.7 72.5 83.6
Left Cam NN(%) 13.9 42.7 10.0 8.1
Right Cam NN(%) 12.7 34.6 17.5 8.3
1https://youtu.be/poRbH kB2M
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we introduced an Ensemble Bayesian Neural
Network structure for system redundancy in the decision
making of safety-critical systems. Our algorithm was im-
plemented on an autonomous driving task using end-to-end
Imitation Learning. Prediction uncertainty capturing both
model imperfection and data insufficiency of each BNN
within the ensemble was used to switch between the different
policy outputs. Experimental results verified the robustness
of our proposed method against compromised sensor inputs.
Our method can play an important role in any kind of
autonomous systems using multiple sensors, especially in
dealing with safety-critical tasks.
For future works on Ensemble Bayesian decision making,
we will further investigate the switching mechanism in the
ensemble to ensure safe and stable operation during switch-
ing. Furthermore, we will explore smooth Bayesian mixing
models as an alternative to our current switching mechanism.
Finally, we would like to also extend this Ensemble Bayesian
approach to robust filtering and state estimation problems,
where we use multiple sensors or networks.
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